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A competitive partial-equilibrium spatial model with heterogeneous goods is constructed 
to evaluate effects of the removal of tariffs, tariff-rate quotas, and sanitary regulations on 
world poultry trade.  The model distinguishes between ￿high-value￿ (mostly white meat) 
and ￿low-value￿ (mostly dark meat) poultry products and simulates the trade flows 
between eight exporting and importing countries and regions.  Removing all barriers 
simultaneously has larger impact on trade than only removing tariffs and tariff-rate 
quotas.  Imposition of sanitary barriers against US products by Russia shifts trade flows, 
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EFFECTS OF TARIFFS AND SANITARY BARRIERS ON  










  World poultry markets are one of the most rapidly growing sectors of the food 
industry. Poultry production rose six-fold between 1965 and 2002 to over 70 million tons. 
Consumption increases have exceeded population growth, with world per capita supplies 
of poultry meat tripling from 3.3 kg to more than 10 kg.  International trade has more 
than kept pace with this industry growth. World exports of poultry meat rose from 
375,000 tons in 1965 to over 6.5 million tons in 2002.  Thus, trade now accounts for 
about 10% of world consumption.  
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the effects of sanitary barriers to poultry 
trade in the context of the economic incentives and other trade policy decisions that 
determine product flows in international poultry markets.  Poultry flocks are susceptible 
to diseases that can spread domestically and across borders.  Microbial contamination of 
poultry for human consumption is also a serious problem in the sector, as with other 
meats, and is addressed by health regulations in exporting and importing countries. Thus, 
poultry markets are subject to a complex mix of national and trade sanitary regulations,  
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together with non-technical barriers in the form of tariffs and tariff-rate quotas (TRQs).  
The 1995 World Trade Organization Agreement on Agriculture and on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures have, to some extent, affected this mix, 
reducing levels of non-technical border protection, while tightening the rules for sanitary 
measures. 
To evaluate the policy effects on world poultry trade, a perfectly competitive, 
spatial partial-equilibrium model with heterogeneous goods is constructed to simulate the 
trade flows between six key non-composite exporting or importing regions (five countries 
and the European Union (EU)) and two rest-of-world region aggregates.  The model 
incorporates several extensions of previous work.  First, most previous analysis of the 
economic effects of technical barriers has examined bans on product shipments across a 
single border (Calvin and Krissoff; Paarlberg and Lee).  Since alternative trade 
opportunities have not been evaluated in these case studies, assessment is precluded of 
arbitrage occurring through trade ￿deflection￿ when a bilateral ban leads other exporting 
countries to increase their sales to the specific importing region, with the ￿banned￿ sales 
going elsewhere in world markets.  As will be seen, there is a complex non-transitive set 
of existing bilateral poultry sanitary barriers between regions, indicating that trade 
deflection plays an important role in global poultry markets.   
The second extension of previous work in our model is the separate identification 
of high-value (mostly white meat) and low-value (mostly dark meat) poultry products.  
Earlier poultry models have aggregated all products into a single category (Alston and 
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bilateral trade data indicate that most often a country￿s imports and exports are 
concentrated in either high-value or low-value products. Maintaining this distinction 
significantly affects the benchmark model and simulated results of removing non-
technical and sanitary trade barriers. Orden, Josling and Roberts provide a simplified 
model with products differentiated by high and low value but assumed to be 
homogeneous between regions within each market category.  
 
2. MODEL 
  A heterogeneous good, spatial partial-equilibrium model with perfect competition 
affected by non-technical and sanitary trade barriers is used to represent the global 
poultry sector.  There are eight regions in the model:  United States (US), Brazil, the EU, 
Japan, China, Russia, a rest-of-world poultry exporting region (ROWE), and a rest-of-
world poultry importing region (ROWM).  The non-composite regions were chosen 
because they account for a significant portion of world poultry production (approximately 




  All production, processing, and distribution activities within each region are 
aggregated into one industry.  This level of aggregation is a simplifying assumption and 
reflects that for some regions, such as the United States, the production and processing 
activities are vertically integrated. A positive linear relationship is assumed between an 
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A wide range of poultry products are traded and are aggregated in the model into 
two distinct categories:  high-value and low-value products.  The high-value poultry 
product includes white meat (breasts and wings) of chicken and turkey along with de-
boned meat and specialty items.  Low-value poultry is comprised of mainly dark meat 
(drumsticks and thighs) of chicken and turkey.
3 White and dark meats are produced in 
essentially equal and fixed amounts per bird and are thus treated as jointly produced 
goods in the model.  The distinction among trade flows in high-value and low-value 
products is a reflection that most countries mainly import (or export) dark (or white) meat 
due to the preferences of domestic consumers relative to production.  For example, China 
and Russia import low-value poultry products, the EU imports high-value poultry 
products, and the US, and also the EU, export low-value products. Brazil, in contrast, 
exports both high- and low-value poultry parts.  
Because of the assumption of joint production, the supply responsiveness of the 
poultry sector depends on an aggregate poultry price, which is an average of the high-
value and low-value poultry prices.  Joint production links the high-and low-value 
supplies and thus affects the simultaneous price determination in both markets. For 
example, an increase in the high-value poultry price will encourage more high-poultry 
products to be produced.  However, to produce more high-value poultry also entails the 
production of more low-value poultry products.  If the demand for low-value poultry 
remains constant, then an increase in low-value poultry production would lead to a 
                                                 
3 The distinction between white and dark meat product categories is consistent with industry 
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reduction in the price of low-value poultry.  This low-value price reduction would offset 
some or possibly all of the high-value price increase, reducing the incentive to expand 
poultry production.   
Formally, the relationship between the high-value and low-value poultry prices 
and the poultry supply response can be seen using the definition of the aggregate poultry 
price: 
( 1 )        0.5 0.5 AHL PPP = + , 
where  A P  is the aggregate poultry price,  H P  is the high-value poultry price and  L P  is the 
low-value poultry price.  Totally differentiating equation (1) and converting the 
differentials to percentage changes yields: 







Multiplying each term on the right-hand side by  AA qq , where  A q  is quantity of 
aggregate poultry production and noting that  0.5 H LA qq q = = : 
(2)  
0.5 0.5 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ AH AL HH LL
AH L H L H H L L
AA AA AA AA
qP qP qP qP
PPP P P r P r P
Pq Pq Pq Pq
=+ = + = + , 
where  H r  and  L r  are the revenue shares of high-value and low-value poultry products.  
The percentage change in the aggregate poultry price is a revenue share weighted average 
of the percentage changes in the individual poultry prices.  Any combination of changes 
in high-value and low-value poultry prices that increase the aggregate poultry price will 
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CONSUMER DEMAND 
 
  Consumer demand for poultry products in each region is represented by a four-
level nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) demand system (see figure 1).  At 
the bottom level, consumers choose among alternative sources of imported high-value 
poultry products or low-value poultry products, respectively.  We have chosen to use an 
Armington specification due to the variation in unit value across exporters for a given 
importing region (see table 1).  This price variation indicates there are some differences 
across countries in the specific types of high- or low-value products being traded.  Thus, 
the low-value poultry being exported from the US is not exactly the same products as the 
low-value poultry from the EU or Brazil.   
In the second-level of the nested CES demand system, consumers choose between 
a domestically produced and an aggregate imported high-value or low-value poultry 
product.  So if imports become more expensive relative to domestically produced poultry, 
consumers will substitute away from imports.  At the third-level, consumers choose 
between aggregate high-value and low-value poultry products.  If the aggregate price of 
high-value poultry, which is a function of the price of imports and the domestic price of 
high-value poultry, increases relative to the aggregate price of low-value poultry, 
consumers will increase their consumption of low-value poultry and decrease their 
consumption of high-value poultry.  At the top-level of the demand system, consumers 
choose between an aggregate poultry product and all other products.  This allows for 
consumers to increase or decrease their overall consumption of poultry products as the 
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Table 1￿Unit Value of 1998 World Poultry Trade, SITC Code 01235, US Dollars 
per Metric Ton 
 Importers 
          A l l   O t h e r s  
Exporters US  Brazil  EU  China  Japan  Russia  High-Value  Low-Value 
US --  --  --  647  1112  719  --  808 
Brazil  --  -- 2505  717  1940 --  1774  -- 
EU  --  --  -- 936 -- 712  --  710 
China  --  -- -- --  1890  --  1563  -- 
A l l   O t h e r s             
High-Value  --  -- 3264 -- 2060 --  --  -- 
Low-Value  --  --  -- 798 -- 885  --  -- 
 
Source: International Bilateral Agricultural Trade Database, Economic Research Service, USDA,   
            developed from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development bilateral SITC trade  
            data.  
Note:  The trade data contained several instances of very small trade flows, generally less than 500 metric 
tons between regions in the model.  Because of their small magnitudes and likelihood that they 
represent trade in specialty poultry products, these trade flows are dropped from the benchmark 





  The base year of the model is 1998.  During that year, all non-composite regions 
imposed tariffs on imported poultry products.  Table 2 summarizes the tariff levels 
imposed by these regions.  The Japanese import market has the lowest tariffs of all of the 
non-composite regions.  This in part reflects the Japanese government￿s encouragement 
of foreign investment by Japanese poultry firms in Brazil, Thailand, and China.  The EU 
restricts poultry imports through TRQs, which are allocated to Brazil, Canada, Mexico, 
and countries in Central and Eastern Europe that have quota-restricted preferential access 
under the Europe Agreements, and imposes prohibitive over-quota tariffs.  Both the US 
and Brazil use tariffs to protect their poultry markets even though they are relatively low-
cost exporters.  
  Because poultry flocks are susceptible to infectious diseases and microbial 
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regulations that impose restrictions on exports from one or several countries.  Table 3 
summarizes whether there are binding sanitary (SPS) barriers between the six non-
composite regions in the model.   
 
Table 2￿Summary of Tariffs Rates Imposed by Non-Composite Regions 
Region Tariff  Rates  Average  Rate 
US  Tariffs bound at $0.088/kg for whole chicken and $0.176/kg for parts (18-
36 % ad valorem). 
25% 
    
Brazil  Tariffs bound in the WTO at 35 % on all poultry products.  35% 
    
China  Tariffs of 45 % on all poultry products.  45% 
    
EU  Tariff of 299 ECU/mt. on whole chicken and 358 ECU/mt. on parts (18-
60 % ad valorem).  Tariff-rate quotas established with quantities allocated 
to Brazil and Central and Eastern European countries. 
20% 
    
Japan  Tariffs of 11.9 % on whole chicken and 8.5 % on parts.  10% 
    
Russia  Tariffs of 30 % on chicken and 15 % on turkey.  Trade agreement with 
EU gives no special access to European imports.  Restrictions on 
transshipments through Baltic countries. 
22.5% 
 
Source:  USITC, USDA, and WTO Schedules 
 
 
Table 3￿Bilateral SPS Barriers to Poultry Trade 
 Importers 
Exporters US Brazil EU China  Japan  Russia 
US    Banned  Banned Allowed Allowed Allowed 
Brazil  Banned    Allowed Allowed Allowed Allowed 
EU  Allowed Allowed    Allowed Allowed Allowed 
China  Banned Banned Banned    Allowed  Allowed 
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One might expect that these regions would divide into two groups, those free of 
highly-infectious poultry diseases and those that are not free of disease, with trade 
occurring within each group.  However, this is not the case.  The major importers of 
poultry products, China, Japan, and Russia, accept imports from all exporting regions in 
the model.  The two major exporters, the US and Brazil, do not accept imports from each 
other and also ban imports from China, based on recurrent outbreaks of Newcastle 
Disease.  The EU also bans imports from the US and from China. The main point of 
disagreement between the US and the EU is on the use of end-of-line chlorine 
decontamination in US processing facilities.  The EU does not consider this to be 
equivalent to trisodiummonophosphate or lactic acid decontamination, and therefore has 
banned poultry imports from the US.  Imports of poultry from Brazil into the US are 
banned based on intermittent outbreaks of poultry diseases in Brazil. The EU does not 
block imports from Brazil due to disease problems.  Finally, Brazil￿s SPS barrier against 
imports from the US is based on the decision that the inspection system for poultry 
processing plants in the US is not equivalent to its own. Thus, diverse sanitary barriers 
applied differently among countries lead to a complex set of trade opportunities. 
DATA 
  The benchmark bilateral trade flows are obtained from the USDA International 
Bilateral Agricultural Trade Database that is adopted from trade data of the United 
Nations and contains information on the quantity, in metric tons, and the value of poultry 
trade in each category
4. The UN trade data distinguishes six, five-digit SITC categories 
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for trade in poultry products.  These SITC categories separate poultry into whole birds, 
cuts, and livers, as well as between fresh or chilled and frozen.  The dominant SITC 
category is 01235, ￿Poultry cuts and offal (other than livers) frozen,￿ which accounts for 
nearly 70% of world (excluding intra-EU) poultry trade.  Because of our interest in 
differentiating the distinct markets for high-value and low-value poultry products, we 
focus our analysis on these frozen poultry cuts. The next largest category is SITC 01232, 
￿Poultry not cut in pieces, frozen,￿ which accounts for approximately 20% of world 
poultry trade.  We exclude this and the other four categories to retain tractability in our 
differentiated-product model. 
  The bilateral trade flows within the category of frozen poultry cuts were assigned 
to either high-value or low-value products based on the unit values computed from the 
data (see table 1).  For example, Brazilian exports to Japan and the EU (with unit values 
of $1940 and $2505, respectively) are assumed to consist of high-value poultry products, 
while Brazilian and US exports to China, or US exports to Russia (with unit values of 
$717, $647 and $719, respectively) are assumed to consist of low-value poultry products.  
Table 4 shows quantities of the benchmark bilateral trade flows in high-value and low-
value products on this basis. The only gray area in this dichotomy is US exports to Japan, 
whose unit value does not appear to fit in either category.  In examining the US trade data 
at the 10-digit HS level, approximately 70 percent of US exports to Japan are in the 
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Because nearly all of US exports to China and Russia also fall in the same category, and 
to avoid creating a second low-value products classification in the model, we assume that 
US exports to Japan are low-value products.
5 Given the relatively small amount of US 
poultry exports to Japan (76,100 metric tons), this abstraction should not substantially 
affect the model results.    
The level of poultry production for each region is given in the first column of 
table 4.  It is the 1998 estimate of poultry meat production (obtained from the Food and 
Agriculture Organization FAOSTAT database).  The level of poultry production in the 
two composite regions is determined by first identifying which countries are net poultry 
exporters in FAO trade data.  Then, the level of poultry production in the ROWE region 
is the sum of production in these exporting countries.   Poultry production for the ROWM 
region is obtained by subtracting the quantity of poultry meat produced in China, the EU, 
Brazil, Japan, Russia, the US, and the ROWE region from world poultry production. 
  Data on domestic prices of high and low-value poultry products by region were 
not available.  The general magnitude of these prices can be inferred from the reported 
unit trade values and estimated transportation costs shown in table 5.  Exact domestic 
prices for each region for the base case scenario were determined as part of the model 
calibration process. 
                                                 
5 When comparing the unit export values within the 10-digit HS category between Japan, China, and 
Russia, the unit export value to Japan were approximately 50% higher, indicating that even within this 
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Table 5￿Transportation Costs 
 US  Brazil  EU  China  Japan  Russia  ROWE  ROWM 
  Dollars per mt. 
US  --  190  180  222  205 212 250  275 
Brazil  190  --  190  260  252 200 250  211 
EU  180 190  --  203  235 214 250  239 
China  222 260  203  -- 139 240 211  285 
Japan  205 252  235  139 --  235 174  250 
Russia 212  200  214  240  235  --  250  250 
ROWE  250 250  250  211  174 250  -- 350 
ROWM  275 211  239  285  250 250 350 -- 
 





  The calibration process for the CES demand system begins at high- and low-value 
import sub-utility functions because it is the level where both initial quantities and 
expenditure are observed.  The CES utility and sub-utility functions, for each region i, for 
each level of the demand system in figure 1 can be expressed as: 
















⎩⎭ ∑∑  
where  j α is a shift parameter to be determined during calibration,  j x is the quantity of 
good j consumed, n is the number of goods consumed, σ is the elasticity of substitution 
for that level in the nested CES demand structure, and the regional subscript i is 
suppressed for simplicity.  The resulting demand function and true cost-of-living price 
index for each level are then: 
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⎩⎭ ∑ , 
where I is total or group expenditures,  j p is the price of good j, and  M P is the price index.   
  Typically, equation (4) is calibrated by rescaling all prices to equal one and 
setting the values of  j α  equal to the associated import share of that good from region j 
into region i.  A problem with this approach is that if region j does not export to region i 
in the initial equilibrium,  j α  is set equal to zero which then bars the possibility of region 
j from exporting to region i after reform of trade policies occurs.  Because removing trade 
barriers could alter the observed pattern of trade, this method of calibrating the  j α  is 
clearly constraining.  By assuming instead that all  j α α = for those countries exporting to 
a given region in a given scenario, then  j α  can be eliminated from equations (4) and (5).
6  
The implication of assuming all  j α α = is that imports from each region with which trade 
is considered feasible are consumed in equal amounts if all import prices are the same.  A 
limitation of the assumption that all  j α ￿s are assumed to be equal is that the calibrated 
prices can not be made to exactly match the data-derived export unit values for all 
regions. This is because the differences in relative import quantities are strictly due to 
relative price differences, whereas choice of unique  j α ￿s for each exporting region 
reflects other demand factors affecting relative import levels. 
                                                 
6 This is due to the ordinal properties of all utility functions.  If all α￿s are equal in equation (2), then a 
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  Using equation (4) under our assumption on the  j α ￿s, the prices of imported 
high-value or low-value poultry products are determined to replicate the benchmark trade 
flows and total expenditures on imports by each region. The values of the calibrated 
import prices are also a function of the value of the elasticity of substitution between 
import sources ( 4 σ  in figure 1).  The smaller the value of this elasticity, the larger will be 
the calibrated import price differentials between regions.  Various values for the import 
elasticity of substitution were tried during the calibration process.  Values of less than 10 
resulted in much larger price differentials than the differentials in unit export values 
while values over 10 did not reduce the price differentials substantially.  Therefore, the 
elasticity of substitution between imports is assumed equal to 10 for all regions.
7   
  To illustrate the price calibration process, consider the imports of high-value 
poultry into Japan.  In the benchmark, three regions, Brazil, China, and the ROWE export 
385,100 mt. of high-value poultry to Japan at a value of $752.4 million.  A system of 
three equations, representing the quantity of high-value poultry imported from each 
region, in three unknowns, the import prices, is then solved.
8  The resulting import prices 
are tariff inclusive c.i.f. prices.  Continuing with the Japan example, the calibrated high-
value import prices per mt. for the base model scenario are $2,312 for Brazil, $2,078 for 
China, and $2,172 for ROWE.  Corresponding base case domestic poultry prices were 
calculated from these results.  Dividing the calibrated import price by the one plus the 
tariff rate and then subtracting the transportation costs given in table 5 determines the 
                                                 
7 Alston and Scobie considered two different values for this parameter, 3 and 36, in their analysis.  We use 
a value of 5.0 in conducting a sensitivity analysis of our results. 
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domestic price for each of the exporting countries, as shown in table 4.
9 The domestic 
price of high-value poultry in Japan is estimated to approximately equal the average 
import price. 
  For low-value poultry, the domestic price for the US and the EU are averages of 
the calibrated tariff-inclusive c.i.f. prices for China and Russia adjusted for the tariffs and 
less transport cost (ROWM is excluded from the averages because transportation costs 
are not known).  For Brazil, the domestic low-value price is based on the calibrated c.i.f. 
price for China.  For China, Russia, and ROWM, the domestic low-value poultry price is 
set equal to the average tariff-inclusive c.i.f. import price in each region. For Japan, the 
import price and domestic price of low-value poultry are set at the domestic US price 
plus transportation costs and tariffs. 
  While the domestic prices for most high-value and low-value product can be 
determined from the calibrated import prices, tariffs, and estimated transport costs, 
alternative methods must be used for regions that do not export or import a given poultry 
product.  For the US, the high-value poultry price is set equal to an average wholesale 
price of chicken breast, chicken wings, and turkey breast (USDA, AMS).  For Russia, the 
domestic high-value price is set equal to the average domestic high-value price in Brazil, 
China, and ROWE times the 22.5 percent tariff rate.  Thus, the domestic high-value price 
in Russia would be less than the domestic price of the potential exporters plus transport 
cost.  This assumption is made because Russia does not import any high-value poultry 
and a domestic price less than the exporter￿s price plus transport cost would discourage 
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high-value exports to Russia.  Finally, because of the TRQ in the EU, the calibrated high-
value import prices are not considered accurate reflections of the EU domestic prices.  In 
1998, the average wholesale price for young chickens was approximately $1,750 per 
metric ton (European Commission).  Thus, the EU high-value poultry price was 
computed such that the simple average of the domestic high-value and low-value price 
equals $1,750. 
 
Remaining Demand Parameters 
Once domestic prices for all products have been calculated, the parameters in the 
remaining CES utility and sub-utility functions can also be determined.  Since all the 
remaining groups in the nested CES have only two goods, equation (4) is modified to: 
















For example, consider the sub-utility functions that govern the substitution between 
domestic and import high-value (low-value) poultry products.  Then  j x is the quantity of 
the domestic poultry product consumed,  j p is the domestic price,  m p  is the import price 
index, determined using equation (5), σ  is the elasticity of substitution between domestic 
and imported products (i.e., the Armington elasticity or  3 σ  in figure 1), and I is 
expenditure on high-value (low-value) poultry products.  Once an elasticity of 
substitution is chosen, the only unknown parameter that needs to be chosen is the shift 
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 Values  for  13  and  σ σ  in each region are obtained from the Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP) database.  The elasticity of substitution between poultry and all else ( 1 σ ) 
is set equal to the Allen partial elasticity of substitution between the GTAP commodity 
￿other meat products￿ (which includes poultry meat) and an all other commodity 
aggregate for each region (see table 6).  Given that the budget share for all poultry 
products is small, the value of  1 σ  basically determines the aggregate own-price demand 
elasticity for poultry.
10  The Armington elasticities in the GTAP database vary across 
products, but not across regions.  We use a value of 2.5, which is an average between the 
two GTAP commodities that include live and processed poultry products.   
No estimates of the elasticity of substitution between high-value and low-value 
poultry products ( 2 σ ) were available.  Because of the strong consumer preferences for 
either white or dark meats in various regions, such as the preference for white meat 
versus dark meat in the US and the converse in Brazil and Russia, it is assumed that 
substitution possibilities in demand between high-value and low-value products is 
limited.  Therefore, we assumed an elasticity value of 0.5 for all regions.  Based on the 
assumed values of the elasticities of substitution and the initial consumption budget 
shares, all poultry products are gross substitutes for one another in all regions. 
  The implied own-price uncompensated demand elasticities for high-value and 
low-value poultry for all regions are given in table 6.  In general, the demand elasticities  
                                                 
10 The aggregate demand elasticity for poultry is equal to  ( ) 11 1 A s σ σ − − , where sA is the budget share 
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for domestically produced products are inelastic while the elasticities for imports are 
elastic.  This difference is due to much smaller consumption shares for imports.  The 
relatively larger demand elasticities in Japan are due to smaller poultry consumption 
shares.  These demand elasticities are within the ranges used by previous studies.
11 
Table 6￿Demand Elasticities at Initial Prices 





b IHV  DLV  ILV 
US  0.30  -0.33  -0.47  
Brazil  0.20  -0.27  -0.43  
ROWE  0.15  -0.24  -0.41  
EU 0.20  -0.30  -2.45  -0.46   
China 0.25  -0.36    -0.60  -2.30 
Japan  0.40 -1.17 -1.75 -0.80 -2.18 
Russia 0.10  -0.32    -1.72  -1.06 
ROWM  0.20 -0.32 -2.47 -0.68 -2.23 
 
a  Elasticity of substitution between poultry products and all other products in consumers￿ utility 
function in figure 1.  The other elasticities of substitution in figure 1 do not vary across countries.  
The assumed values of  2 σ ,  3 σ , and  4 σ  are 0.5, 2.5 and 10 respectively. 
b  The abbreviations DHV, IHV, DLV, and ILV stand for domestic high-value poultry products, 
imported high-value poultry products, domestic low-value poultry products, and imported low-
value poultry products.  Cells without an entry represent zero consumption in the benchmark data 
set. 
c  The unconditional own-price elasticities for a nested CES utility function are derived based on the 
formula from Keller for the own-price Allen partial elasticities of substitution.  For example, the 
own-price Allen partial elasticity of substitution for domestic high-value poultry products is: 
() ( ) ( )
11 1 1 1
32 1 1 p DHV DHV HV HV P cc c c c σσ σ σ
−− − − − ⎡⎤
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
=− − + − + − , 
where  DHV c ,  HV c , and  P c  are the initial budget shares of domestic high-value poultry, all high-
value poultry, and all poultry respectively.  Then, the unconditional own-price demand elasticity 
for domestic high-value poultry, noting that the CES utility function is homothetic, is defined as: 
 
() 1 DHV DHV DHV c ε σ =− . 
The same procedure is utilized for the other poultry products. 
  
                                                 
11 Koo and Goltz assume perfectly inelastic demand, Alston and Scobie use a demand elasticity of -0.5 for 
all regions, Beck et al. use demand elasticities of -0.56 for broilers and -1.09 for turkey, and Wang et al. 
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Supply Response 
Little empirical evidence exists on poultry supply elasticities across regions.  
Wang et al. assumed a supply elasticity of 1.175 for China.  Kapombe and Colyer 
estimated a supply response of 0.13 for US broiler production.  Because of the lack of 
supply elasticity estimates across regions, we consider two difference scenarios.  The first 
scenario is a long-run scenario where regions have time to build more production and 
processing facilities.  For this scenario, we follow Alston and Scobie and assume an 
aggregate supply elasticity of 5 across regions.
12  The second scenario is a short-run 
scenario where we assume an aggregate supply elasticity is 0.5 for all regions. 
 
3. RESULTS 
  The model developed in the previous section is used to analyze the impacts on the 
global poultry sector of four alternative policy changes.  First, we remove all tariffs and 
the EU TRQ among the six non-composite regions but leave any sanitary (SPS) barriers 
in place.  Second, we remove only the SPS barriers.  Third, we remove all trade barriers 
among the six non-composite regions, a ￿free trade￿ scenario.  The final policy change is 
drawn from recent events, a Russian ban on low-value imports from the United States 
(see Ames for the chronology of one recent dispute). In the base case model scenario, 
production, domestic prices and trade flows shown in the first column of table 7 (see page 
33) match table 4. 
                                                 
12 The parameters of the linear aggregate poultry supply function are chosen such that the aggregate supply 
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REMOVAL OF TARIFFS AND TRQs 
 
  In analyzing this policy change, we consider four different scenarios.  Given the 
uncertainty of the magnitude of poultry supply elasticities, we conducted this experiment 
using the two supply responses discussed in the previous section.  In addition, we 
consider scenarios where liberalization could change the existing trade patterns.  In 
particular, we analyze the case where Brazil becomes an exporter of low-value poultry to 
Russia and the ROWM region.  Given the growth of the Brazilian sector into a major 
player in poultry export markets, there is some potential for Brazil to enter these two 
markets.  The order of discussion of these scenarios begins with the longer-run supply 
elasticities maintaining the existing trade patterns, and then considers changes in the trade 
patterns using the same supply elasticities.  The last two scenarios use the shorter-run 
supply elasticities. 
  
Long-run Supply Elasticities  
The removal of all tariffs and TRQs results in the reduction of the relative price of 
imported poultry products in all importing regions.  This results in an increase in the 
demand for imported poultry products in those regions.  Trade in high-value and low-
value poultry products increases by 913,000 mt, or 26.3% (see table 7, columns 1 and 2).  
Because low-value poultry products accounts for the majority of poultry trade in the base 
case, approximately two-thirds of the trade increase is in low-value products.   
  The regional impacts depend on import and export patterns of that region and on 
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products, but does not trade high-value products.  Tariff liberalization results in an 
increase in US low-value exports by 282,000 mt or 13.8%.  The largest increase in 
exports is to China, which has the largest tariff reduction, followed by an increase in 
exports to Russia.
13  To satisfy the increase in export demand for low-value products, the 
US must increase poultry production and/or decrease domestic consumption of low-value 
products.  The US low-value poultry price increases by 8.0%, achieving both an 
expansion in production and a decrease in domestic demand from consumers substituting 
high-value products for low-value products.  Because of the joint nature of poultry 
production, an expansion in production implies an increase in both high-value and low-
value poultry products.  If the expansion in production is greater than the substitution 
effect in demand, then the price of high-value products will fall.  This is the case for the 
US, with the price of high-value poultry declining by 1.8%.  Note that this decrease in the 
US high-value price limits the expansion in US poultry production because it offsets 
some of the increase in the US low-value price, making the increase in the US aggregate 
poultry price smaller.  When taking these two effects into account, US poultry production 
increases by 0.9% or 130,000 mt. 
  The impacts of liberalization on Brazil and the aggregate exporting region 
(ROWE) are similar because these regions export both high-value and low-value 
products in relatively equal proportions.  Again, because both poultry products are 
produced in equal, fixed proportion, the increase in exports can be accomplished with an  
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expansion in production without requiring large relative poultry price changes.  The 
prices of high-value poultry increase by 1.8% and 1.6% respectively in Brazil and the 
ROWE while low-value poultry prices increase by 2.5% and 2.3% respectively.  Because 
the prices of high-value and low-value poultry products both increase, the aggregate 
poultry price increases by a larger percentage in Brazil and ROWE compared to the US.  
Thus, there is a larger expansion in poultry products in these regions (6.1% for Brazil and 
5.0% for ROWE) than in the US. 
  China and the EU experience different effects from liberalization because they are 
importers and exporters of poultry products.  Thus liberalization will result not only in an 
increase in demand for each region￿s exports, but an increase in import demand by each 
region as imports become relatively cheaper than domestic poultry.  The impact on 
poultry production and prices in China and the EU depends on the relative strength of the 
increase in exports versus imports.  China is a much larger importer of low-value poultry 
than an exporter of high-value products.  Coupled with the largest decrease in tariffs, this 
results in an increase in low-value imports by 646,000 mt while exports remain 
essentially constant (a small 20,000 mt decrease).  The decrease in the demand for 
Chinese low-value poultry results in a 9.1% drop in the price of this product.  This price 
reduction in turn leads to a reduction in Chinese poultry production and therefore a 
reduction in supply of both high-value and low-value products.  Because the decrease in 
the supply of Chinese high-value poultry is greater than the decrease in demand (due to 
Chinese consumers substituting relatively lower price low-value poultry for high-value 
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of the TRQ results in a larger increase in high-value imports (257,000 mt) than the 
increase in low-value exports (22,000 mt).  Because of the larger decrease in demand for 
EU high-value products relative to the increase in export demand for EU low-value 
products, the EU high-value poultry price declines, reducing the aggregate EU poultry 
price and therefore EU poultry production.  Again, because of the assumption of joint 
production, a drop in EU poultry production reduces the available supply of EU low-
value poultry.  Thus, the increase in export demand coupled with a decrease in supply 
leads to an increase in the price of EU low-value poultry.   
  Russia is an importer of low-value poultry products.  The removal of tariffs on 
imported low-value poultry products reduces the price of imports versus domestically 
produced low-value poultry for Russian consumers, causing consumers to substitute 
imported low-value poultry for domestically produced low-value poultry.  The decrease 
in demand for Russian low-value poultry leads to a 9.6% price reduction and a 3.9% 
reduction in Russian poultry production.  The demand for Russian high-value poultry 
also decreases as consumers substitute to the relatively less expensive low-value 
products.  However, this decrease in demand is less than the decrease in Russian high-
value poultry supply, causing the price of Russian high-value poultry to increase by 
2.9%. 
  Both Japan and the aggregate importing region (ROWM) import both high-value 
and low-value poultry products.  However, the ROWM is not included in the assumed 
reduction of trade barriers because of limited information about trade policies of the 
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the initial benchmark, Japan imports roughly five times more high-value poultry products 
than low-value poultry products.  Thus, the removal of Japanese tariffs has a larger 
impact on Japanese high-value products than low-value products.  Due to the decrease in 
the relative price of imports, Japanese purchases of imported high-value products 
increase by 35,000 mt while the purchases of low-value products increase by 11,000 mt.  
The substitution of imported poultry products for domestically produced poultry products 
decreases the demand for Japanese poultry, leading to a 3.2% reduction in the Japanese 
poultry production and a 1.8% decrease in the Japanese price of high-value products.  
However, because the drop in the production of low-value Japanese poultry is greater 
than the decrease in demand, its price increases by 2.8%.  In the ROWM region, 
liberalization by other countries results in the prices of imported poultry increasing 
relative to domestically produced poultry.  This causes consumers in the ROWM to 
substitute domestically produced poultry for imports, increasing the demand for ROWM 
poultry.  Because the ROWM region imported approximately 10 times more low-value 
poultry in the initial equilibrium, there is a much larger increase in the demand for 
ROWM low-value poultry versus high-value poultry.  However, the expansion in 
ROWM poultry production to meet this increase in demand results in equal increases in 
high-value and low-value poultry production.  Thus, while the price of ROWM low-value 
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Entry of Brazil into New Markets 
The third column in table 7 reports the results for the scenario where tariffs and 
the EU TRQ are removed and Brazil enters new markets to export low-value poultry to 
Russia and the ROWM using the long-run poultry supply elasticities.  In this scenario, 
Brazil becomes a direct competitor with the US and the EU in the Russian and ROWM 
low-value poultry markets.  This new entry leads to both a substitution and expansion 
effect (stemming from the assumed demand structure) in those markets.  Holding 
expenditures on imported low-value poultry products constant, new entry leads to a 
reduction in market share for all incumbents.  However, since the CES demand structure 
is ￿variety loving,￿ the price index of imported products decreases with new entry leading 
to an expansion in imports.  For the US and the EU, the substitution effect dominates the 
expansion effect with exports to Russia and the ROWM declining compared to the base 
case.  For Brazil, the substitution and expansion effects in Russia and the ROWM 
reinforce one another, leading to roughly a 300% increase in Brazilian low-value exports.  
This is a much larger increase in Brazilian low-value exports compared to the previous 
scenario. 
  The main impact from the larger increase in Brazilian low-value exports is that 
the price of Brazilian low-value poultry increases relative to the US and EU low-value 
poultry prices.  This is opposite compared to the previous scenario.  This helps the US 
and the EU increase their sales of low-value poultry to China, due to the substitution 
effect, and allows both countries to offset some of their lost sales in Russia and the 
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smaller increases in the price of low-value products and the US has a smaller overall 
increase in poultry production (51,000 mt) while the EU experiences a larger overall 
decrease in poultry production (39,000 mt).   
 
Short-run Supply Elasticities 
    In the short-run, because poultry producers cannot respond as much to changes in 
poultry prices, one would expect that trade liberalization would have smaller effects on 
production and trade, compared to the long-run.  This can be seen by comparing columns 
two and four or columns three and five in table 7.  All regions experience a smaller 
increase or smaller decrease in poultry production in the short-run compared to the long-
run.  Because of the smaller production expansion in poultry exporting countries, there is 
a 10-15% smaller increase in high-value poultry trade and approximately 5% smaller 
increase in low-value poultry trade in the short-run.   
  With an inelastic supply response, one would also expect that trade liberalization 
would have larger impacts on prices changes compared to a longer-run scenario with 
more elastic supply.  However, due to the joint production of high-value and low-value 
poultry products, this is not always the case.  For example, the decrease in the price of US 
high-value poultry is smaller in the short-run than in the long-run.  This is because of a 
smaller increase in US poultry production in the short-run puts less downward pressure 
on the US high-value price.  Similarly, there is a smaller increase in the Chinese high-
value price and the EU low-value price.  Smaller reductions in poultry production in both 
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Finally, a smaller reduction in Russian poultry production in the short-run provides 
enough additional high-value poultry such that the price decreases in the short-run 
compared to a price increase in the long-run. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Because the base value of 10 for the elasticity of substitution among import 
sources ( 4 σ  in figure 1) may be considered ￿high￿ by some, we also examined the four 
previous scenarios using an elasticity of substitution of 5 among import sources.
14  The 
effect of reducing this parameter is to lessen the substitution effect between competing 
imports relative to the expansion effect of lower import prices from the removal of 
existing tariffs.  Because the majority of poultry trade is in low-value products and the 
US is the least cost low-value producer, a smaller substitution effect means smaller 
increases in US low-value exports.  When the existing trade patterns are maintained, the 
gain in US low-value exports are 40% to 50% lower (long-run and short-run).  If Brazil 
enters the Russian and ROWM low-value poultry markets, then US low-value exports do 
not significantly increase.   
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REMOVAL OF SPS BARRIERS 
 
  In this scenario, all of the SPS barriers listed in table 3 are removed.
15  With the 
EU￿s TRQs still in place, removal of the SPS barriers on US and Chinese imports is moot 
because these countries do not have quota rights.  Thus, only the US￿s ban on Brazilian 
and Chinese poultry products and Brazil￿s ban on US and Chinese poultry products are 
effectively removed.  Since the US is a large exporter of low-value poultry, it is only 
likely that Brazil or China would export high-value poultry products to the US.  But 
given the size of the US poultry sector and the differences in the bases prices plus  
transportation costs, it is unlikely that the lifting of the US SPS sanctions would generate 
a significant amount of export sales.  The same is true for US or Chinese exports to 






  In this scenario, all non-technical and SPS barriers are simultaneously removed.  
The most important effect comes from the removal of the EU￿s TRQs and SPS barriers 
that we assume allows for access to the EU high-value poultry market for US poultry 
                                                 
15 This does not necessarily imply that all such regulations are unnecessary or protectionist in intent.  Full 
risk-based evaluation of the impact of alternative sanitary regulations and the consequences of their 
modification are needed to complete judgments about whether a particular regulatory barrier is an efficient 
and effective way of controlling health dangers.  Here, we limit our analysis to the effects of removing 
these barriers between our aggregated regions, without providing a full assessment of whether doing so 
would raise sanitary risks among these trading partners. 
16 These are not the strongest results from our model because in the absence of any imports by Brazil or the 
US in the benchmark data a preference for imports would have to be arbitrarily specified to induce any 
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producers.
17  The main impact of this policy change, seen by comparing the results in 
columns six through nine with those in columns two through five in table 7, is an 
expansion of US high-value and low-value exports relative to other exporters.  Focusing 
on the long-run results, with new market access to its high-value poultry market, the US 
exports around 100,000 mt of high-value poultry to the EU.  Compared to the base case, 
the drop in the US high-value poultry price is less when all trade barriers are removed 
than with only the non-technical trade barriers removed.  This leads to a greater 
expansion in US poultry production by an additional 173,000 to 193,000 mt.  Because of 
the jointness in poultry production, more US low-value poultry is produced and therefore 
the price increase is smaller when all trade barriers are removed.  With a lower low-value 
price, the US is able to also expand its low-value poultry exports by around 70,000 mt.   
 
RUSSIAN BAN ON US LOW-VALUE POULTRY IMPORTS 
 
  Russia is a major market for US low-value poultry products, accounting for nearly 
one-third of all US low-value poultry exports in 1998.  An import ban on US low-value 
poultry by Russia would reduce the demand for US low-value poultry products while 
increasing the demand for these products from US competitors.  Consequently, the price 
of US low-value poultry falls while the prices of low-value poultry from Brazil and the 
EU increase.  As shown in the last four columns of table 7, the US low-value poultry 
price decreases by $31 to $36 per mt, or 6.4% to 7.4%, compared to the base price.  The 
                                                 
17 Simultaneous removal of the tariff-rate quota and SPS barriers might also give China access to the EU 
market but exports from China are mostly labor-intensive processed products targeted at the Japanese 
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changes in Brazilian and EU low-value poultry prices depend on whether Brazil is 
assumed to export to Russia or not.  Without access to the Russian market, the Brazilian 
price remains virtually unchanged and the EU price increases $87 to $101 per mt, or 
14.5% to 16.8%.  With access to the Russian market, the Brazilian low-value price 
increases $95 to $115 per mt while the EU low-value price increases $22 to $28 per mt.  
Because of this change in relative prices, the US increases its low-value exports to China 
and the ROWM.  Increased US exports to these regions offset some of the loss of exports 
to Russia, yielding an overall reduction in US low-value exports of 220,000 mt to 
266,000 mt (10.8% - 13.1%).  The changes in US poultry production is much smaller, 
63,000 mt to 112,000 mt (0.4% - 0.7%) because the lower price of low-value poultry 
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4.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
  This article has utilized a competitive partial-equilibrium spatial model with 
heterogeneous goods to examine the effects of non-technical and sanitary barriers that 
impede trade among five countries and the EU, which account for the majority of poultry 
trade, and two composite (exporting and importing) regions. The model draws a key 
distinction between high- and low-value poultry products, which are jointly produced but 
have distinct patterns of trade among the eight countries and regions in the model. On the 
demand side, we specify a four-level nested CES system in which imported poultry 
products in the high- and low-value categories compete with the similar goods produced 
domestically. Calibrating the model under the assumption that imports by a region would 
be consumed in equal amounts if all import prices were the same, we replicate observed 
trade flows, and derive import and domestic prices consistent with the benchmark data.  
  Our simulation results suggest that non-technical barriers to trade among the eight 
countries and regions have significant effects on world markets. Under our long-run 
elasticities, global trade would expand by more than 25% if non-technical trade barriers 
were removed by the major importers.  Conversely, removal of only sanitary barriers 
opens few trade opportunities.  Thus at the level of aggregation of our model, sanitary 
barriers alone would seem not to warrant as much consternation as they have provoked in 
poultry trade.  But removing non-technical and sanitary barriers simultaneously creates 
additional trade opportunities compared to only removing non-technical barriers; in our 
case, primarily from the additional access the US gains to the EU market.  The effects on 
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liberalization scenarios. Similar results would likely hold for other, more disaggregated 
bilateral trade disputes that have arisen over application of sanitary barriers precluding 
trade that otherwise would take place. 
Our disaggregated results for high- and low-value poultry products also yield 
insights about the effects of trade policies on poultry markets. For the US, for example, 
with removal of non-technical trade barriers, expansion of poultry production to meet 
increased export demand for low-value products pushes down the domestic price of high-
value products, whereas prices of high- and low-value products increase in Brazil. 
Production falls in the major importing regions with removal of trade barriers, but again 
the joint production of high- and low-value poultry, as well as increased trade flows, 
determine the effects on specific prices (and marketed quantities) within each country. 
When Brazil is assumed to enter Russia and the aggregated poultry-importing region as 
new markets, effects on production and exports resulting from trade policy reform are 
reduced for the US and EU, and their exports are partly diverted to China. Similarly, if 
US products are excluded from Russia, as has happened several times based on ostensible 
sanitary concerns, arbitrage opportunities partially ease the impact on the US poultry 
sector. These arbitrage effects are often overlooked in assessments of specific bilateral 
trade disputes, especially those involving sanitary issues. Our results show that these 
market arbitrage possibilities matter. They also show that both non-technical and sanitary 
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